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1 INTRODUCTION 
Labour law, it has been said. is essentially concerned with the way in 
which the workplace is governed (Weiler t 990: t 5). I Whereas the Labour 
Relations Act of t 956 was premised on the view that the workplace be-
longs to, and is governed by, the employer (subject to a requirement that 
workers should be treated fairly) the 1995 Act introduces a wholly differ-
ent paradigm: it regards the worker as an "industrial citizen" who is 
entitled to enjoy rights and freedoms in the workplace which mirror those 
which the interim Constitution protects in society at large. The new Act in 
effect constitutes a "charter of industrial citizenship" (Grodin t 99 t: 1). 
The purpose of this article is to establish how the new Labour Relations 
Act 66 of t 995' treats one source of workplace governance. that is collective 
bargaining and to highlight some of the implications arising from its treat-
ment of the subject. Of particular importance in this regard are the implica-
tions of the endorsement of the principle of freedom of contract by the new 
Act for arbitrators, who will be reqUired to resolve disputes arising from 
collective agreements. It is quite evident that the Act vigorously pursues a 
policy of abstentionism in relation to the bargaining process and its out-
come. To that extent, its underlying philosophy is no different from that of 
its predecessor. However, the premises upon which the new Act's absten-
tionist stance is founded differ fundamentally from those which informed 
the t 956 Act. Whereas the latter regulated the bargaining process without 
regard for the disparities which exist in the rights and sanctions of manage-
ment and organised labour, the new Act sets out to establish greater balance 
of power between the parties in order to ensure a more effective bargaining 
process, greater stability, and more balanced outcomes. 
I Sources of workplace governance include State regulation; unilateral control by em-
ployers over certain aspects of the employment relationship: collective bargaining and 
partiCipatory structures at workplace leveL 









































LAW. DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
2 PHILOSOPHY OF THE NEW ACT 
The 1956 Act was premised on a "pluralist" perspective) of the relation-
ship between management and organised labour. It proceeded from the 
assumption that there exists an equilibrium of power between the two 
sides which makes it unnecessary and undesirable for the State or its 
organs to intervene in the substantive results of collective bargaining. 
Within this scheme, the appropriate role of the courts was to supervise the 
bargaining process and, subject to certain prescriptions. to allow freedom 
of contract to prevail, even if the bargain was struck on terms which were 
unreasonable or clearly favoured one party over the other. 
However, as Weiler (1984: 387) has observed, if the law tied the hands of 
one party to the bargaining process and yet refused to adjust the rules 
governing the actions of the other, it can hardly be said to exhibit neutrality 
regarding the results of the contest: Whatever rights organised labour 
wanted, had to be secured by agreement with employers or obtained from 
the industrial court in terms of its unfair labour practice jurisdiction. 
However, in view of the Act's ostensible abstentionist approach, interven-
tion by the courts in the bargaining process has met with strong criticism.s It 
was nevertheless inevitable that the disparities in the parties' relative legal 
positions would have moved unions to put their faith in the courts to grant 
them the rights which they were unable to secure by agreement with em-
ployers or through the exercise of economic power. It was probably also 
inevitable that the courts, perhaps sensing that the law did not treat the 
parties even-handedly, would succumb to the temptation of getting involved 
in the fray. 
As it was put in Macsteei (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA:6 
"In my view the LRA creates machinery which makes collective bargaining not 
only possible but compulsory. Its aim is to avoid if possible, industrial strife and 
to maintain peace. Its operation is such that. if parties negotiate genuinely and 
in good faith. and their demands and offers are reasonable. settlement will be 
reached before disruption takes place. if not through agreement inter partes. 
then with the help of the machinery provided for in the Act. The legislature 
tried to create circumstances enabling the parties to negotiate freely as long as 
they do so diligently and reasonably In the process it is necessary that the 
parties must be on an equal footing. and that the one party does not have an 
unfair advantage over the other. which will force it to capitulate to unreason-
able offers or demands. That being so. I am of the view that any action aimed 
at creating an advantage for the one party over the other. disturbs the equality 
which the Act tries to establish. and is therefore unfair .... 
While the approach of the new Act is also abstentionist, it is, as stated 
earlier. founded on entirely different premises. Its gUiding philosophy is 
self-governance. which it seeks to promote by: 
(a) establishing a threshold of individual and collective worker rights. 
including the right to strike; 
2 
3 For a critique. see Rycroft &. Jordaan (1992: I 19). 
4 See also Rycroft &.Jordaan (1992: 125). 
5 See. ego Thompson &. Benjamin (1995: 30ft). 









































COLLECTiVE BARGAINING UNDER THE NEW LRA 
(b) limiting the employer's power to unilaterally alter terms and condi-
tions of employment; and 
(c) by granting the parties the largest possible measure of freedom of 
contract. At the same time, the Act removes the bargaining process 
and its outcome from scrutiny by the courts and instead subjects it to 
limited arbitral supervision. 
2.1 A threshold of rights 
The Act guarantees freedom of association for both employers and work-
ers; establishes organisational rights (subject to certain thresholds) and 
provides for the right to strike. 
The right to associate, as provided for in the Act, involves three aspects, 
namely, the right to join registered organisations and to participate in their 
lawful activities; the right of registered organisations to plan and organise 
their own administration and activities; and the prohibition of any form of 
discrimination or differential treatment on account of a person's exercise of 
rights conferred by the Act. 
While the Act respects the autonomy of trade unions and employer or-
ganisations,' it nevertheless seeks to ensure democracy within these organi-
sations. This is evident from the following: the constitutions of organisations 
must provide for ballots to be held before a strike or lock-out is called;' 
provision must be made for appeals against termination of organisational 
membership or loss of the b~nefits of membership;" and members of trade 
unions or employer organisations who fail or refuse to participate in a strike 
or lock-out may not be disciplined or have their membership terminated if 
no ballot was held prior to the strike or lock-out or. where a ballot was held, 
if the majority of members who voted did not vote in favour of the strike or 
lock-out.'o Unlike its predecessor, the Act makes provision for the resolution 
of disputes between organisations and their members arising from the 
organisations' constitutions." 
It is regrettable, however, that the Act does not provide for a duty of fair 
representation. While such a duty may be implicit in the constitution of an 
organisation, it would not, for example, extend to workers who are not 
trade union members but who are, in terms of a collective agreement, 
nevertheless represented by the union in collective bargaining. Provision for 
such a duty may, of course, be made in a collective agreement and would 
then become enforceable through arbitration proceedings. 
As far as the right to strike is concerned, the most significant aspect of the 
Act's protection of strike activity is that it is both narrower and wider than 
that provided for under the 1956 Act. It is wider in the sense that the defini-
tion of a strike covers all forms of concerted activity aimed at remedying or 
7 S 8. 
8 S 95(5)(p). 












































LAW. DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
resolving employment-related grievances and disputes, including a refusal to 
work voluntary overtime,'2 It is also narrower because not all strike activity 
is protected, While the previous Act made no distinction between strikes 
over so-called "rights" and "interest" disputes, the new Act expressly prohib-
its strike action over the former. '3 However, the most important provision 
for current purposes is section 76. which implicitly permits the employment 
of temporary replacement labour in the event of a strike, (This provision 
should be read with section 95(5)(q) which requires the constitution of a 
trade union to prohibit disciplinary action against members who refuse to 
participate in a strike, where the strike was not preceded by a ballot or the 
strike did not receive majority support in a ballot.) As Weiler (1984: 387) 
states, it is here where the most crucial imbalance in collective bargaining 
can arise, The question. however, is whether the Act should ensure a fairer 
contest by prohibiting the use of replacement labour? To quote Weiler 
(1984: 413): 
"I do not believe so, for two reasons, First, the employer's right to hire re-
placements to reduce the impact of a strike is. to a large extent, reciprocal to 
the employees' right to take other jobs in order to protect themselves against 
toss of income, True, most workers are unable actually to exercise this legal 
right, , , [However) if the labor laws forced employers to experience the loss of 
a strike as a real incentive to compromise at the bargaining table, fairness 
should require that the same legal constraints be placed on union members, 
But there are major problems, in both principle and practice, in trying to en-
force such an intrusive restraint on workers' Freedom to support themselves 
and their families during collective work stoppages, 
This consideration gives nse to my second objection to outlawing employers' 
use of strike replacements. Were we to bar the recruitment of replacements or 
the strikers' taking other jobs. the law would insulate the parties from outside 
competition, Such insulation runs very much against the grain of a market-
based system of collective bargaining, , ,"" 
To the above may be added that although an employer may be entitled to 
hire replacements. it will not always be in a position to do so, The absence 
of required skills; the potential cost in terms of training; the harm done to 
shopfloor relations; or the potential for violent behaviour towards replace-
ments. may cause the employer to forego the opportunity of appointing 
replacements, While the use of replacement labour does not deprive wor-
kers of the right to strike. a total ban on the use of replacement labour will 
mean that the employer is denied the right to do business, It is submitted 
that a substantial case would have to be made out on the basis of public 
policy why this should be the case, The mere fact that replacement labour 
may reduce the effectiveness of the strike, it is submitted, is insufficient, 
In any event, the new Act does not leave workers entirely defenceless in 
the face of an employer's decision to use replacements: the Act gives them a 
12 It was held in SAB v FAWU (1989) 10 fLJ 844 (AJ that a refusal to work "voluntary" 
overtime did not constitute a strike under the 1956 Act. 
13 S 65( I )(c) 
14 Weiler'S arguments should be seen against the background of United States law, where 
employers are permitted to replace strikers permanently, The right to do so was estab-










































COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER THE NEW LRA 
right to picket and allows for secondary action to discourage the use of 
replacements. In addition, unions are permitted to discipline members who 
ignore a strike call endorsed by the majority of union members," while 
employers are generally prohibited from disciplining any worker who 
refuses to do the work of someone on strike." 
2.2 Limitation of the employer's ability to act unilaterally 
The new Act limits an employer's ability to act unilaterally in three ways. 
First, while subjecting strikes and lock-outs to the same procedures and 
requirements, the Act attributes a lesser status to the lock-out: whereas 
workers enjoy the right to strike, there is no equivalent right to lock-out. 
The practical implication of this is that while workers may not be dis-
criminated against for exercising the right to strike, employers who decide 
to lock workers out may be targeted for picketing, secondary action, 
product boycotts, etcetera. 
Second, while it permits both offensive and defensive lock-outs, the Act 
prohibits so-called termination 10ck-outsH and bans the use of temporary 
replacement labour in the event of an offensive lock-out.'s Finally, in terms 
of section 64(4) of the Act workers and trade unions are provided with a 
status quo remedy with which they can temporarily halt the unilateral im-
plementation of changes to terms and conditions of emploxment, pending 
compliance with agreed or statutory conciliation procedures. Q 
2.3 Freedom of contract 
The Act recognises both freedom to contract as well as freedom oj con-
tract and consequently does not compel bargaining over terms and condi-
tions of employment. Apart from establishing a framework for bargaining 
at sectoral level, protecting existing bargaining relationships,Lo and regulat-
ing certain forms of bargaining conduct,2! it is content with leaving the 
decision to bargain in the hands of the parties. As far as the outcome of 
collective bargaining is concerned, the Act generally allows the parties by 
agreement to "contract out" of its provisions. 
15 S 95(5)(q). 
16 S 187 (I )(U). 
17 S I 87(1)(c). 
18 S 76(1). 
19 The provision has a strong resemblance to s 10 of the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act. 
20 Sch 7 item 13(2). 
21 Instead of imposing a blanket duty to bargain in good faith. the drafters of the Act 
appear to have targeted the most notorious past instances of bad faith conduct for 
specific regulation. The outstanding examples are s 16. which compels disclosure of 
information. s 64(4) which regulates unilateral changes to terms and conditions of 
employment. and s 5 which establishes very broad protection against any form of vic-
timisation. Employers and unions may obviously agree to include an obligation to bar-
gain in good faith in their procedural agreements. in which event any allegation of bad 
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2.3. t The bargaining process 
Whatever compulsion there will be on employers to bargain with trade 
unions over terms and conditions of employment will in future be gener-
ated by workers and their unions themselves through the exercise of their 
organisational rights and the right to strike. However. the desire on the 
part of employers to institutionalise or restrain the unhindered exercise of 
these rights should constitute enough of an incentive for them to agree to 
establish formal bargaining relationships.22 
2.3.2 Bargaining outcomes: the status and content of collective 
agreements 
The Act's abstentionist philosophy is most vividly illustrated by the status 
which it attributes to collective agreements. Provided they are entered into 
in writing. all collective agreements enjoy contractual status under the Act 
and will be binding on the parties to the agreement and their members. 2' 
This also applies to agreements entered into at bargaining councils H 
As far as the content of collective agreements are concerned. the Act gen-
erally allows collective agreements to trump its own provisions. It even goes 
as far as allowing for collectively agreed limitations on certain constitution-
ally guaranteed rights. For example. section 64(1 )(a) prohibits a strike where 
a collective agreement determines that the issue in dispute is not strikeable. 
By agreement between an employer and a majority union, such a limitation 
may also be extended to workers who do not belong to the union con-
cerned. thereby also depriving them of the right to strike over that particular 
issue. Similarly, trade unions which do not represent the majority of em-
ployees in a workplace may be deprived of the right to organise on the 
shoplloor if an employer and majority union agreed in terms of section 18 
to grant exclusive rights to the majority union. 
3 RESOLUTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING DISPUTES: 
THE ROLE OF ARBITRATORS 
By formulating the residual unfair labour practice concept in narrow 
terms, the drafters of the Act deliberately attempted to shield the collec-
tive bargaining process from intrusion by the courts. Yet it provides for 
arbitral intervention (of an advisory nature) where a dispute concerns a 
"refusal to bargain", and for compulsory, binding. arbitration of all dis-
putes involving the "interpretation or application" of collective agreements. 
22 The special dispute resolution mechanism provided for in s 64(2) may provide an 
added incentive for employers to recognise a representative union. The section pro-
vides for compulsory advisory arbitration prior to any industrial action being embarked 
upon. where the issue in dispute concerns an alleged "refusal to bargain". This includes 
a refusal to recognise a trade union. 
23 S 23 
24 Where. however. the agreement is extended by the minister to non-parties. it will take 
on the character of subordinate legislation and will apply to such non-parties as a mat-










































COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER THE NEW LRA 
While the phrase "refusal to bargain" is defined in section 64(2), the 
meaning of the phrase "interpretation or application" of collective agree-
ments is left undefined. Non-compliance with a collective agreement 
seems to fall within the ambit of the phrase, but termination or suspen-
sion of the agreement arguably does not. This is because specific provision 
is made in Section 64(2)(b) for advisory arbitration if the dispute con-
cerned the "withdrawal" of recognition of a bargaining agent. As the 
withdrawal of recognition inevitably involves the termination of the rec-
ognition agreement, any dispute involving the latter is therefore subject to 
advisory - as opposed to binding - arbitration. Otherwise, however, the 
phrase "interpretation or application" of a collective agreement would 
seem to cover every conceivable dispute arising from or in connection 
with a collective agreement. 
This potentially gives arbitrators very broad scope for intervention in the 
content of collective agreements. For example, they may be required to 
determine whether the conduct of a party constitutes a breach of an agree-
ment and what remedies to award. Furthermore, they may be required to 
imply particular terms into collective agreements in order to ensure 
"business efficacy". Finally, given that all contracts are subject to a require-
ment that their content must be lawful - that is, not contrary to law or 
public policy - arbitrators will have very wide scope indeed to develop 
public policy in the collective bargaining sphere. 
What norms should inform arbitrators in the development of the new 
collective bargaining jurisprudence? As I have tried to indicate, in relation to 
collective bargaining the Act strongly endorses the principle of freedom of 
contract. This implies, first, that arbitrators should refrain from making an 
agreement for the parties by, for example, implying terms which the parties 
themselves did not contemplate. Where terms are implied, it should be 
done with a view to give efficacy to the agreement or to safeguard the 
fundamental rights of individual workers. 
As regards the latter, conflicts are bound to arise between the interests of 
the parties to a collective agreement and the rights of individual workers. 
Here arbitrators will need to strike a balance between the conflicting inter-
ests and fashion appropriate remedies. This could, for example, be done by 
implying a duty of fair representation into every collective agreement to 
ensure the equal treatment of workers who are covered by an agreement 
but who are not members of the relevant trade union; or by requiring that 
any limitation of fundamental rights should be justified in terms of business 
necessity or protection of the union's collective exercise of rights. 
It could be argued that arbitrators ought to playa far more intrusive role 
because bargaining outcomes cannot be viewed in isolation from the bar-
gaining process or the structural inequalities which may exist between the 
parties. Contracting parties, it has been said, "are heavily influenced by the 
laws of property, inheritance, corporation, incorporation, and the like, all of 
which shape the resources that parties can deploy in the supposedly free 
market" (Weiler t 990: 385). 
From a policy point of view, however, distributional inequalities should 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
bargaining disputes25 as they - and the tools they use are generally ill-
equipped (0 devise a better solution to a problem they may believe have 
been dealt with unfairly in the parties' own agreement. This, coupled with 
the new Act's abstentionist stance and its attempt to equalise the parties' 
opportunities for the effective use of economic power, again suggests that 
arbitrators ought generally to refrain from going beyond the terms of a 
collective agreement when they are engaged in the resolution of a dispute 
involving the application or interpretation of collective agreements. 
4 CONCLUSION 
The 1995 Labour Relations Act requires disputes concerning the interpre-
tation and application of collective agreements to be resolved through 
conciliation and arbitration. When arbitrating such disputes, commission-
ers may be tempted, particularly because their terms of reference are not 
decided by the parties to the dispute, to adopt an interventionist approach 
in regard to the terms of collective agreements. However, this article tried 
to demonstrate that such an approach would be inappropriate in view of 
the Act's non-interventionist philosophy. Given this, as well as the fact that 
the Act seeks to ensure a more even distribution of rights between man-
agement and organised labour, the principle which should guide arbitra-
tors in their endeavour to resolve disputes arising from collective 
ments is that of freedom of contract. 
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